(Art by Justine Smith)
Dylan Fujitani, wrote an article entitled, “The Hardest of the Hardcore”: Let’s Outlaw Hired Guns in Contemporary American Warfare, in which he states six areas substantiating why the use of military contractors is a detriment and not an asset during U.S. conflicts.
- The expense incurred for these non-governmental employees are not included in government totals, thereby skewing the actual war costs to the public.
- These military contractors, which he calls mercenaries, have no loyalties except to their employers
- Large number of military personnel jumping ship for the private sector and subsequent larger paychecks, could be perpetuating selfish interests for war.
- Many of these mercenaries are of a dubious background
- When contractors/mercs engage in illegalities on the battlefield they are not subject to the same disciplinary measures the military they work alongside must adhere to.
- “Action must be taken now to disable this circumvention of democracy and to protect legitimate uses of war from market forces, lawlessness, and the abuse of power.” He states. (Fujitani, p. 418)
Dylan Fujitani’s angle of vision is clear right from beginning with the title, Let’s Outlaw Hired Guns in Contemporary American Warfare, he chose. All six of the problematic areas Dylan lists are set up too persuade the reader the practice of hired military contractors is not a good one. Dylan’s persuasion is strong and if the reader is still not sure after reading the article, they most certainly walk away with many questions. Dylan has effectively planted seeds of doubt when it comes to the use of mercenaries as hired guns during wartime. Most concerning was the issue of loyalty on the part of the mercenaries. “According to the Brookings Institution’s, P. W. Singer, during the Persian Gulf War, ‘a very small number’ of private contractors working at an airbase in Saudi Arabia fled from fear that chemical weapons might be used.” (Fujitani, p. 416) It is difficult to find data specifically listing how many fled, but even if the number was extremely low, Fujitani has achieved his goal in persuading the reader these hired guns may not be as committed as our men and women serving in the military.
Americans are a very patriotic group of people and Dylan’s article rates high on the pathos scale. Veteran support is on the rise and regardless of one’s political views on the Iraqi war, most concur our veterans are indeed heroes. On top of digesting Dylan’s presentation that mercenaries have a laissez-faire attitude, the reader must comprehend the enormous salary difference between the hired guns and the veterans fighting side by side. Compound this with the fact the mercenary seems to be exempt from discipline for any infractions, the pro-veteran reader will have a propensity to become defensive and protective of the young men and women risking their lives for our country. “As P. W. Singer has pointed out, a soldier faces a court-martial for refusing to face battle, whereas a contractor merely loses his job.” (Fujitani, p. 416) Where is the fairness in all of this? Dylan has touched an emotional nerve, at least with me and I would venture a guess with many readers.
Dylan is not shy when it comes to using credible sources and bolstering his article with direct quotes from each source. This in turn gives Dylan credibility and those reading his article are more apt to give it their full attention. Dylan uses attributive tags throughout when introducing his sources so the reader can wrap their head around who the sources are and what their areas of expertise may be. Joshua Hammer of the New Republic, David Barstow a New York Times reporter and journalist Louis Nevaer, a writer for the National Catholic Reporter are just a few, Dylan uses to persuade the reader mercenaries are not such a good idea. Angle of vision is present and so is the effective use of pathos, appealing to fairness and patriotism; ethos, by citing credible sources and writing a concise article; and logos, with the numerous sources, attributive tags, and quotes.
Dylan’s point about the American public being kept in the dark concerning the actual number of ‘military’ (governmental and mercenaries) is accurate. The figures for mercenaries are separate from the government numbers during wartime fiscal accountability. So while the American public may be lead to believe we are withdrawing troops from Iraq, are we really? “If you think the U.S. has only 160,000 troops in Iraq, think again. With almost no congressional oversight and even less public awareness, the Bush administration has more than doubled the size of the U.S. occupation, through the use, of private war companies. In essence, the Bush administration has created a shadow army that can be used to wage wars unpopular with the American public but extremely profitable for a few unaccountable private companies.” Further support to Dylan’s claim the hiring of mercenaries, results in millions of unaccounted monies, is in The Commission on Wartime Contracting, which states, “At least one out of every six dollars spent on defense contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than $31 billion, has been lost to fraud, waste, and abuse-and that number is climbing.”
Dylan’s argument that hired guns for the military hold no national loyalties is not a valid one, at least at face value. This is a stretch in Dylan’s persuasive attempt for the reader to see his angle of vision. Common sense dictates, if a person, is employed by a private company they will be loyal to their employer to ensure the future of their career. This does not translate to the person not being loyal to their country. I believe the point Dylan is trying to make here, is since the mercenary is not answerable to the military and only their direct employer, the private contracting firm, the mercenary is hence primarily loyal to their employer. The bigger problem when discussing national loyalty has to do with the private contracting company itself, much more than their individual employees. The Guardian printed an article discussing loyalties of military contractors, which stated, “Most worryingly of all, perhaps, powers that were once the exclusive realm of national government are now in the hands of private companies whose prime loyalty is to their shareholders.” This is the crux of the issue and Dylan could have been a little clearer in this regard.
Fuijitani’s problematic area addressing legal ambiguity and immunity from military discipline for these hired guns haunts many in military circles. Even former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld while defending the use of hired guns admitted they are not bound to the same accountability and discipline as the military. “It is clearly cost effective to have contractors for a variety of things that military people need not do, and that for whatever reason other civilians, government people, cannot be deployed to do. Of course we’ve got to begin with the fact that, as you point out, they’re not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” Additionally, a wonderful example, regarding the problems, associated with the military’s lack of disciplining, these hired guns, is one recorded by General Nash. “It takes a great deal of vigilance on the part of the military commander to ensure contractor compliance. If you’re trying to win the hearts and minds and the contractor is driving 90 miles per hour through the streets and running over kids, that’s not helping the image of the American army. The Iraqi’s aren’t going to distinguish between a contractor and a soldier.” Incredibly, these military officers while in battle have their hands tied when it comes to disciplining the private contractors.
This is where I think Dylan missed out on, a great opportunity to persuade his audience by discussing what this disparity between military and non-military, mercenaries, must do for the morale of our troops. Seeing the lack of accountable for their actions and being aware of the enormous pay difference must be tough for the veterans working alongside these private sector personnel. Associate professor of sociology at Washington College, Ryan Kelty, has conducted “10 years of research with sailors and soldiers serving in the U.S., Korea, Afghanistan, and Iraq.” “He served on the faculty at the U.S. Military Academy for three years before joining the Washington College faculty.” Professor Kelty has been researching how military personnel feel working with private contractors and this is what he found. “They feel relatively deprived compared to the contractors and therefore less satisfied with their jobs and less committed to the organization,” Kelty says. “It doesn’t matter if the soldier works alongside a contractor doing the same job every day, or only sees contractors occasionally – having contractors integrated in the unit reduces cohesion, which then decreases job satisfaction and retention.”
Dylan claims these hired guns have questionable backgrounds but I could find no conclusive evidence to support his claim. However, having said that one could surmise with common sense if the legal ambiguity is such a big concern in the military sector, it must be because the hired guns are putting themselves in precarious positions, committing illegalities. Therefore, one could at least argue they were dubious in character prone to such actions prior to employment. Since many of their employees are former military, which I would assume do not have criminal pasts, I would be inclined to sit on the fence with this problematic area of concern Dylan raises without conclusive documentation.
This is tough issue to sift through because while Dylan raises some very valid concerns, the more one delves into the available research the more one becomes aware of just how thin our military is stretched and how private military contractors may be the only solution. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, writer for the History News Service has some plausible answers to this dilemma. “If governments are going to use mercenaries, they should deputize them so that they are held to the same rules as uniformed soldiers. It also means that governments that hire private forces must be prepared to hold them accountable in courts of law for their actions — just as privateers had to appear in special ‘prize courts.’ Congress could take an important step by developing a code of conduct for private military contractors and encouraging other states to do the same.[3]” Finally, in the words of Dylan himself, “These problems must be addressed swiftly and immediately, particularly by Congress.” (Fujitani, p. 418)
Works Cited
Commission on Wartime Contracting(CWC). Section 841. Transforming Wartime Contracting, Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks. August 2011. http://cybercemetary.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213815/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/
Fujitani, Dylan. “The Hardest of the Hardcore”: Let’s Outlaw Hired Guns in Contemporary American Warfare.” Allyn & Bacon Guide to Writing, 2013, pp. 415-419
Gvosdev, Nikolas K. The Return of the Mercenary, History News Service, April 20, 2004 http://historynewsservice.org/2004/04/the-return-of-the-mercenary/
Merle, Renae. “Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq.” Washington Post, December 5, 2006. Htt;://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/05/AR2006120401311.html
Scahill, Jeremy. The Mercenary Revolution: Flush with Profits from the Iraq War, Military Contractors See a World of Business Opportunities. The Indypendent. August 10, 2007. Issue #107
US Department of Defense News Transcripts. Sec. Rumsfeld’s remarks at John Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. December 5, 2005. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcripts.aspx?transcriptid=1361
Washington College Publication
http://www.washcoll.edu/live/news/5034-civilians-and-soldiers-in-the-workplace